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INSIDER TRANSACTIONS
reasonable if the court had held that the acquisition and transfer
of the 25,942 shares were a "purchase" and "sale" by Gamble-
Skogmo which resulted in a technical violation of the statute.3 4 But,
since no profit was realized on the transaction, there was nothing
the plaintiff could recover. Again, the only recoverable profit would
be on the 6,058 shares that were retained by Gamble-Skogmo and
later sold.
It is unfortunate that both of the courts in Gamble-Skogmo
failed to express clearly their concept of the trust fund's relation-
ship to the corporation. Nevertheless, whether the trust fund be
considered separate from or part of the corporation, there seemingly
was no "profit realized" by Gamble-Skogmo on the 25,942 trust
fund shares. Therefore, it is submitted that a correct application
of the statute in this case should have allowed plaintiff to recover
only the profit made on the 6,058 shares actually involved in the
short-swing transaction.
F. LEE LIEBOLT, JR.*
Corporations-Section 16(b) Liability-Conversion
Transactions by Insiders
In Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster,' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit has taken a novel approach to certain
questions concerning liability under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.2 Defendant Webster, a director of Heli-Coil Corporation,
purchased a quantity of the corporation's callable debentures, which
were convertible into common stock any time before redemption or
maturity. Within six months of the purchase of the debentures,
Webster converted, exchanging the- bonds for 3,600 shares of com-
mon stock, and within .six months of conversion, he sold 1,300
shares of the Heli-Coil common. There had been no call oh the
debentures. The corporation brought suit to -recover short-swing
profits under the provisions of section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act.3 The district court held that the conversion of the
'Cf. Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
* Student at the University of North Carolina School of Law.
'352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
248 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
8 (b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or
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debentures into common stock was a "purchase" of the common
and a "sale" of the debentures within the meaning of section 16(b) 4
and decided that Webster was therefore liable for profits derived
from the "sale" of the bonds within six months of their "purchase,"
and for profits from the "sale" of the common within six months
after it was "purchased" in the conversion transaction. An award
of 116,544.36 dollars was rendered in favor of the corporation.
The court of appeals affirmed the finding of the lower court, but
decided that Webster had realized no "profit" within the meaning
of section 16(b) from the "sale" of the debentures and reduced
the judgment to 45,144.36 dollars, representing the profits from the
"sale" of the common stock only.
Section 16(b) of the act provides for recovery by a corporation
of any profits realized by an "insider" of the corporation if its
securities are listed on a national exchange or traded over-the-
counter and it has a total of 750 or 500 shareholders, depending
upon the date, and assets of at least 1,000,000 dollars.5 An "insider"
is any officer, director, or ten per cent beneficial owner of any class
of securities of the corporation.6 Enforcement of this provision is
aided by section 16(a), which requires that insiders of such corpo-
rations file reports as to their holdings and transactions in any of
officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized
by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of
any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such securit was
acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted,
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in
intering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months.
Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any
security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the
issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after
request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no
such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such
profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the
time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security
involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission
by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
'Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963).
78 Stat. 565, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964).
a See note 7 infra.
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the corporation's equity securities.' The act was designed to in-
sure to the public the maintenance of fair and honest markets in
securities.' Section 16(b) itself was prompted by many abusive
practices of corporate insiders in securities transactions prior to
1934."
In its application, section 16(b) is meant to impose an objec-
tive, strict liability, requiring no proof of actual use of inside in-
formation.' The fact that the person comes under the definition of
"insider" is sufficient." This requirement is needed in order that
the provision be effective, because of practical difficulties in proving
use of such information. The strict wording of the statute not-
withstanding, there is allowance for some administrative flexibility
in that the Securities and Exchange Commission is given the power
to make rules exempting from the section types of transactions that
it believes were not comprehended to be within its purview. 12 The
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other
than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section
781 of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of
such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such
security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date
of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 781(g) of this
title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, direc-
tor, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, if such security
is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the ex-
change) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which
he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each
calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such owner-
ship during such month, shall file with the Commission (and if such
security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file
with the exchange), a statement indicating his ownership at the close
of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have
occurred during such calendar month.
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
'Among thesi were situations in which insiders with advance knowledge
of facts that would depress the market price sold their stock at then current
prices and repurchased when publication of the information had the antici-
pated effect, and situations in which insiders with advance knowledge would
buy stock and sell after an anticipated subsequent rise in prices. See Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231,-cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); S..R x.
No. 792, 73d Cong.; 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
" "[W]e are of the opinion ... that it was the intention of Congress
in enacting § 16(b) to obviate any necessity for a search of motives of
the insider or require an investigation of whether or not his actions were
animated by inside information to gain a speculative profit." Heli-Coil Corp.
v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965).
"1 See Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368 U.S.
403 (1962).
1" See note 3 supra.
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Commission has thus become the "watchdog" of section 16(b), by
acting in this statutory capacity to prevent harsh liabilities.18
Under section 16(b), there must be a "purchase and sale," or
"sale and purchase," and "profit realized" within the definition of
the act. 4 The question whether conversion of a convertible security
fits into these requirements is the problem in Heli-Coil and will be
the concern of this note.
The act defines "purchase" as any "contract to buy, purchase,
.or otherwise acquire,"' 5 and "sale" as "any contract to sell or other-
wise dispose of."' 6 Thus under section 16(b) the two terms are
given broader definitions than those usually understood.'1 Some
courts,' 8 relying on Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte,"0 one of the
two leading decisions in the area, have decided that conversion of
a convertible security into common stock is a "purchase" of that
stock under section 16(b). In Park & Tilford, the defendants were
beneficial owners of over ten per cent of the common stock of the
corporation and of a large block of convertible preferred shares.
The corporation gave notice of a redemption of the preferred, and
the defendants then converted their preferred into common and sold
at a profit within six months. The court found the conversion a
"purchase" of the common and held the defendants liable for the
profits of the subsequent "sale," reasoning that if conversion was
not deemed a "purchase," it would put the defendant in a position
to abuse any possession of inside information. The court had no
difficulty with the fact that there was a call on the preferred shares,
because the defendants had sufficient voting power to control the
call.
The second of the leading decisions on this question is Ferraiolo
v. Newman."0 Here the defendant director owned convertible pre-
"In the administration of § 16(b) the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has adopted twenty rules exempting various transactions in whole
or in part from its provisions. Rules 16a-1 to -10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1
to -10 (1964); and rules 16b-1 to -10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-1 to -10 (1964).x, See note 3 supra.
1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (13)
(1964).
1" Securities E change Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14)
(1964).
17 See Blau v. Lamb, 163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
E.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Blau
v. Lamb, supra note 17."' 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
20259 F,2d 342 (6th Cir, 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
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ferred shares of the corporation, and a call was issued at a redemp-
tion price less than market price. To avoid loss, defendant con-
verted the preferred to common and sold the common within six
months. The court did not follow Park & Tilford but held instead
that the preferred and common were substantial economic equiva-
lents and that the conversion was in reality forced because defen-
dant played no part in the call and had no power to control it. The
transaction was found to be "not one that could have lent itself to
the practices which section 16(b) was enacted to prevent."2 1
Ferraiolo has been criticized as advocating a subjective approach
to liability under section 16(b) by requiring examination of the
actual circumstances behind the conversion. 2 On the other hand,
Park & Tilford has been favored as representing the objective ap-
proach to section 16(b)3 by imposing liability as a rule of thumb
if the transaction is of a type open to insider abuse by use of
special information. As pointed out, the act itself requires an ob-
jective approach to liability. To take a subjective view would be
to compromise the statute and hamper full realization of its pur-
poses. Admittedly, there must be a policy determination made here,
for an entirely objective approach will of necessity cause hardship
when, as in Ferraiolo, there is a forced conversion. This hardship
must, however, be weighed against the value of fully implementing
the statute itself. When this consideration is viewed in conjunction
with the power of the Commission to make exemptions from the
section, the objective view seems to be correct.
The district court determined that Heli-Coil should be governed
by Park & Tilford.2 The defendant contended the case was
analogous to Ferraiolo, arguing that there was no "purchase" of
the common because the convertible and the common shares were
substantial equivalents.' The court rejected this, seeing the dis-
tinction between Park & Tilford and Ferraiolo as the involuntary
nature of the conversion in the latter case, and held the conversion a
"purchase" of the common and, in addition, a "sale" of the con-
2"259 F.2d at 346." Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 164 (3d Cir. 1965) ; Petteys
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526, 529 (D. Minn. 1965). But
see Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965).
"Ibid.
2, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963).
"222 F. Supp. at 835.
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vertible, purchased less than six months previously. This was the
first time a court had considered the conversion also to have been
a "sale," and, though the idea was not mentioned in Park & Til-
ford, the Heli-Coil court had no trouble basing its decision on that
case. It recognized that Park & Tilford had not actually dealt with
this new question, but decided that its ratio decidendi would de-
termine that issue.2"
The ramifications of such a decision are apparent. By treating
the paper profits on conversion as actual realized profits, the court
subjects the insider to liability for two sets of "purchases" and
"sales" rather than the customary one, thereby compelling the defen-
dant to account for a far greater amount than he actually realized."
Thus, in Heli-Coil his liability was almost doubled-a harsh result
adding an element of punishment to the usual liability under sec-
tion 16(b). Sustaining this result would contravene the statute's
remedial purpose29 as much as adherence to the subjective standard
suggested in Ferraiolo. This was the position of the Securities
Exchange Commission when the lower court decision in Heli-Coil
was rendered. In the court of appeals, the Commission, appearing as
amicus curiae, asserted that section 16(b), literally construed, meant
that conversion is both a "purchase" of the common shares and a
"sale" of the convertible shares,"° but introduced a "substantial and
novel" 31 concept, arguing that defendant did not "realize" any profits
in the "sale" at conversion . 2 It pointed out that the district court
had not considered this issue and said that the words "profit real-
ized" in the act mean a great deal more than mere paper profits, and
neither words used nor the statutory purpose calls for a finding
that a profit was "realized" upon the conversion of the debentures
under the circumstances of this case. When used with reference to
investments, the term "realized" generally refers to the liquida-
tion of an investment position and the collection of whatever
profit has accrued. Although in some situations the statutory
purpose may require a broader concept, this is not such a case.
21 Ibid.
222 F. Supp. at 834.
2 For a discussion of the tremendous losses this can cause the defendant,
see 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 151, 152 (1964).
2 See Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d
Cir. 1959); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
"Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, pp. 8-13, Heli-Coil Corp. v.





In no real sense did Mr. Webster [the insider] liquidate his posi-
tion or collect a profit when he converted .... After the con-
version, as before . .. [he] retained his investment position in
the securities of Heli-Coil and whatever profits had accrued con-
tinued to be at the risk of the market and could disappear without
"realization" if the market price of the common were to decline
substantially. In the parlance of investors, these profits continued
to be "paper" profits both before and after the conversion.
3
The court of appeals, adopting the Commission's position, said:
Measuring the terms "profit" and "realize!' in conjunction, we
think it is clear that Congress intended that ordinarily no gain
in the value of securities should be deemed to be realized as a
profit under the Act until there has been a definitive act by the
owner of the securities whereby the paper value of the securi-
ties has become a real and an includible one-in the case at bar,
by a sale of the common stock by Webster for cash.
4
Accordingly, Webster's liability was reduced to the actual profit
"realized," this being the difference between the value of the com-
mon at conversion, and its subsequent sales price.
Practically the same issue as that presented in Heli-Coil has
arisen in Blau v. Lamb,-5 a case now on appeal to the Second Cir-
cuit. There the defendants acquired convertible preferred shares,
within six months converted into common, and then sold the com-
mon within six months. The court below held that the transaction
constituted a "purchase" of the common, and a "sale' of the con-
vertible preferred. 36 The Securities and Exchange Commission, as
amicus curiae, cited Heli-Coil and took the same position it had
taken there, saying that
the court below correctly held that the voluntary conversion of
preferred stock into common stock constituted a "sale" of the
preferred and a "purchase" of the common .... However, that
... under the circumstances of this case, no profit was realized
by Appellants from the disposition of the preferred stock upon
conversion.
37
It will not be surprising if the Second Circuit in Blau v. Lamb
follows the "no profit realized" position of the Commission as did
"Id at 14, 15.
"Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1965).85242 F. Supp 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"Ibid.
'7 Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 5, Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp.
151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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the Third Circuit in Heli-Coil. This would be only proper in view
of the closeness of the Commission to such transactions and its
statutory power as "watchdog" over section 16(b). 8s The approach
in Heli-Coil is a novel one; however, convincing as it may be, it is
difficult to avoid the impression that it is actually no more than a
stopgap-giving the courts an opportunity to impose a reasonable
liability in accordance with the purpose of section 16(b) while allow-
ing the Commission a chance to formulate and express its own
policy by adopting rules of exemption. This impression is strength-
ened by the fact that the Commission recently has passed an amend-
ment to its rule 16b-98" that will apparently remedy the problems
discussed here. Previously, rule 16b-9 allowed an exemption from
16(b), under certain circumstances, for acquisitions and disposi-
tions of securities in the conversion of one class of security into
another class that has similar characteristics.40 The amendment ex-
tends the exemption to
conversion of an equity security convertible into any class of
equity security of the same issuer; provided that, no more than
15 per cent of the value of the security received at the time of
conversion is received or paid, in cash or other property (other
than the convertible security given in exchange), in connection
with the conversion.
41
This rule will apparently cause the six month short-swing
period to be measured from the time of "purchase" of the converti-
ble security, to the time of the "sale" of the "security as to which
the conversion privilege relates," 41 and will allow profits realized
"8 See notes 3 and 13 supra.
"9 See note 42 infra.
40 Rule 16b-9, 17 C.F.R. 240.16b-9 (1964).
"' Notice of Proposal to Amend Rule 16b-8 and Rule 16b-9 Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Release, No. 7750, Nov. 27, 30 Fed.
Reg. 14742 (1965).
"The full text of the rule as amended by SEC Release, No. 7826, Feb.
17, 31 Fed. Reg. - (1966): § 240.16b-9 Exemption from section 16(b)
of transactions involving the conversion of equity securities.
(a) Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved
in the conversion of an equity security; which, by its terms or pur-
suant to the terms of the corporate charter or other governing. instru-
ments, is convertible immediately or after a stated period of time into
another equity security of the same issuer, shall be exempt from the
operation of Section 16(b) of the Act; Provided, however, That this
rule shall not apply to the extent that there shall have been either (i) a
purchase of any equity security of the class convertible (including any
equity security of the class issuable upon conversion, or (ii) a sale
[Vol. 4
VINSIDER TRANSACTIONS
from any such sale or purchase transactions to be recovered by the
corporation. Its impact in cases such as Heli-Coil or Blau v. Lamb
is obvious, for in either situation it possibly would have relieved
the defendant of all liability under secton 16(b)."
Thus, by the amendment, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion has acted as quickly as could be expected to remedy an un-
fortunate development under section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. The new rule will terminate any questions
on the propriety of the Heli-Coil decision. 4
JOHN R. JOLLY, JR.
of any equity security of the class convertible and any purchase of
any equity security issuable upon conversion, (otherwise than in a
transaction involved in such conversion or in a transaction exempted
by any other rule under Section 16(b) within a period of less than
six months which includes the date of conversion.
(b) For the purpose of this rule, an equity security shall not be
deemed to be acquired or disposed of upon conversion of an equity
security if the terms of the equity security converted require the pay-
ment or entail the receipt, in connection with such conversion, of
cash or other property (other than equity securities involved in the
conversion) equal in value at the time of conversion to more than
15% of the value of the equity security issued upon conversion.
(c) For the purpose of this rule, an equity security shall be
deemed convertible if it is convertible at the option of the holder or
of some other person or by operation of the terms of the security
or the governing instruments.
I8lbid.
"In relation to the amendment, the Commission has moved for leave
to file as amicus curiae in the case of Petteys v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965), now on appeal to the Eighth Circuit.
This case presents a situation different from-but closely related to-that
in Heli-Coil and Blan v. Lamb. In Petteys the defendants held convertible
securities more than six months and then converted to common when a call
on the shares was issued, selling the common shares within six months of
the conversion. The district court, applying very strictly the objective stan-
dard established by Park & Tilford, held that the conversion, though in-
voluntary (defendants were directors, but had no control over the call),
and the subsequent "sale" of the common constituted a "purchase" and
"sale" under section 16(b). The case is thus diametrically opposed to the
position taken in Ferraiolo by the Sixth Circuit. The Commission has
directed the court's attention to the amendment to rule 16b-9, which "would
have an impact on the factual situations such as those in this case." See
Motion Re Amicus Curiae Participation by SEC, p. 2, Petteys v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., supra. The Commission does point out, however, that
the new rule would not apply to cases such as Petteys, where judgment has
already been rendered, but it apparently feels that the Eighth Circuit will
give weight to the new rule in its determination of the case. It seems that
the court of appeals should do this, because of the Commission's statutory
position under section 16(b), and its obvious feeling that section 16(b)
was not intended to produce liability in the ordinary security conversion
transaction.
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